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Abstract
In this paper we propose a formalization of access control policies based on term rewriting. The state of the
system to which policies are enforced is represented as an algebraic term, which allows us to model several
aspects of the policy environment. Policies are implemented by sets of rewrite rules, whose evaluation
produces authorization decisions. We discuss the relation between properties of term rewriting systems,
such as conﬂuence and termination, and their consequences on deﬁning trusted access control policies.
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1 Introduction
Term rewriting [1] is a well-established paradigm for specifying and prototyping
systems. It has been proved useful in theorem proving, program transformation,
and algebraic speciﬁcation. In many practical situations, its straightforward formal
background allowed to rapidly prototype and verify diverse kinds of systems. In
the domain of computer security, term rewriting has been successfully applied to
help reasoning about some of its aspects, notably in veriﬁcation of security proto-
cols [17,7].
Nevertheless, there are not many applications of term rewriting to security
policies: up to our knowledge, few approaches have tried to introduce the use of
rewriting into this domain[2,12]. The reader is referred to see a more extensive
discussion on related work in section 7.
Access control concerns stating the actions which principals (or subjects) are
allowed to execute in order to manipulate the objects (or resources) of a given
system. The most widespread framework for describing this kind of protection is the
access control matrix, a model adopted in the design of several operating systems.
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The rows of the matrix contain the subjects (active entities of the system, such as
processes and users), the columns list the protected entities of the system (relevant
objects, such as ﬁles), and cells contain which access rights (read, write, execute,
etc.) are assigned to each active entity with respect to the protected resources. A
request from a subject to perform a certain action over an object will be granted
only if there exists an entry for that action in the corresponding cell.
Some fundamental models for access control rely on modiﬁed variants of the
access control matrix. For example, military security policies [4] add conﬁdentiality
levels to subjects and objects. Then the ﬁxed security policy states that a subject
cannot write to an object with inferior security level, and that it cannot read from
objects with superior security levels - no reads-up, no writes-down. Even though the
access control matrix is a support for a number of formalizations of access control
policies, it is not appropriate to capture more dynamic policies, such as policies
that depend on time, location, and many other possible attributes of the policy
environment.
This paper presents a formalization of access control policies based on term re-
writing. Policies are represented as sets of rewrite rules, whose evaluation produces
authorization decisions, whilst requests and the environment where policies are en-
forced are represented as algebraic terms. Since we consider the policy environment
as a “database of facts” under the form of a term, this formalization allows us to
capture many dynamic aspects that are important for policy enforcement, e.g. di-
verse attributes of subjects and resources, referred as content-dependent conditions
in the literature [10].
The main goals of this work are to provide a formal semantics for an expressive
access control policy language, which is able to support dynamic policies; to provide
a design, where it is possible to have maintainable enforcement mechanisms, and
to characterize trusted policies by associating properties of the corresponding term
rewriting systems that implement a security policy. For example, the absence of
conﬂicts is an important property when both positive and negative authorizations
are possible. It assures that for a certain access request no grant and denial are
assigned at the same time.
Another goal of this formalization is to be able to facilitate policy enforcement.
The architecture we propose here clearly separates policy and enforcement mech-
anism. Since policies are rewrite rules, a standard rewrite engine can do the job of
applying the policy to requests and evaluating the results.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls some useful deﬁnitions on
term rewriting systems, Section 3 illustrates by an example the kind of access con-
trol policy we want to express, Section 4 presents what are the elements of the
policy environment, Section 5 presents and discuss rewriting-based policies, Sec-
tion 6 describes what kind of security mechanism is necessary to enforce these
policies, Section 7 presents a discussion on related works, and Section 8 concludes
and points out some future developments.
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2 Preliminaries on Term Rewriting Systems
We recall some basic deﬁnitions on signatures and terms. A signature Σ = {S,F}
is a set of sorts S, together with a set of function symbols, each one associated to
a natural number by the arity function (ar : F → N), which denotes the number of
arguments. Fn is the subset of function symbols having n for arity, Fn = {f ∈ F |
ar(f) = n}. T (Σ,X ) is the set of terms built from a given ﬁnite set F of function
symbols and a denumerable set X of variables. The set of variables occurring in
a term t is denoted by Var(t). If Var(t) is empty, t is called a ground term, and
T (Σ) is the set of all ground terms. A substitution σ is an assignment from X to
T (Σ), written, when its domain is ﬁnite, σ = {x1 → t1, . . . , xk → tk}. The result of
applying a substitution σ to a term t ∈ T (Σ,X ) is written σ(t).
A rewrite rule is an ordered pair of terms denoted l → r, where l, r ∈ T (Σ,X ),
l /∈ X , and Var(r) ⊆ Var(l) . The terms l and r are respectively called the left-hand
side and the right-hand side of the rule. A rewrite system or term rewriting system
is a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) set of rewrite rules.
Given a rewrite system R, a term t rewrites to a term t′, which is denoted
t →R t
′ if there exist a rule t → l of R, a position ω in t, a substitution σ, satisfying
t|ω = σ(l), such that t
′ = t[σ(r)].
A subterm t|ω where a rewriting step can be applied is called redex. A term that
has no redex is said to be irreducible for R or in R-normal form.
A rewrite derivation is any sequence of rewriting steps t1 →R t2 →R . . . A
rewrite derivability relation
∗
−→R is deﬁned on terms: t
∗
−→R t
′ if there exists a
rewriting derivation from t to t′. If the derivation contains at least one step, it is
denoted by
+
−→R. A term rewriting systems is terminating if all rewrite derivations
are ﬁnite. It is conﬂuent if for all terms t, u ,v, t
∗
−→R u and t
∗
−→R s implies
u
∗
−→R s and v
∗
−→R s, for some s.
3 Motivating Example
The example that follows has been slightly adapted from the XACML speciﬁca-
tion [20], an initiative from the Oasis Consortium 3 to create a standard markup
language for role-based access control. Let us suppose that a medical corporation
adopts the policy below:
(i) A person, identiﬁed by his or her patient number, may read any record for
which he or she is the designated patient.
(ii) A person may read any record for which he or she is the designated parent or
guardian, and for which the patient is under 16 years of age.
(iii) A physician may write to any medical element for which he or she is the
designated primary care physician.
(iv) An administrator shall not be permitted to read or write to medical elements
of a patient record.
3 http://www.oasis-open.org/
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Si
pa t i en t ( ”Bart Simpson” , 1 , 14 , guardian ( ”Homer Simpson” ) )
+ record ( pa t i en t ( ”Bart Simpson” , 1 , 14 ,
guardian ( ”Homer Simpson” ) ) ,
phys i c i an ( ” Ju l i u s Hibbert ” , 1 ) ,
a n t i b i o t i c , payment ( v i s a ) )
+ phys i c i an ( ” Ju l i u s Hibbert ” , 1)
Request
req ( phys i c i an ( ” Ju l i u s Hibbert ” , 1) ,
writeMedElements ,
r ecord ( pa t i en t ( ”Bart Simpson” , 1 , 14 ,
guardian ( ”Homer Simpson” ) ) ,
phys i c i an ( ” Ju l i u s Hibbert ” , 1) ,
a n t i b i o t i c , payment ( v i s a ) ) )
Si+1
pat i en t ( ”Bart Simpson” , 1 , 14 , guardian ( ”Homer Simpson” ) )
+ record ( pa t i en t ( ”Bart Simpson” , 1 , 14 ,
guardian ( ”Homer Simpson” ) ) ,
phys i c i an ( ” Ju l i u s Hibbert ” , 1 ) ,
a n t i b i o t i c and a sp i r i n , payment ( v i s a ) )
+ phys i c i an ( ” Ju l i u s Hibbert ” , 1)
Figure 1. A system state transition after a request to write a medical element
These rules illustrate the dependency of authorizations on the attributes of ob-
jects and subjects. This reﬂects the current needs in terms of ﬂexibility in the
declaration of access control for modern applications, being a representative of the
kind of policies we are interested in.
The idea behind the statement of access control policies with high level of ab-
straction is that policy speciﬁcation and enforcement can be separated from other
functionalities of the application, thus avoiding bugs and increasing maintainability.
A possible execution of the medical system mentioned above is shown in Figure 1.
At a given point of time, the system is in state si, where the values of attributes
for objects and resources appears in the ﬁrst line of the table. The “+” operator
concatenates terms, it is better explained in section 5. The second line of the table
illustrates the fact that the primary physician of a certain patient record, requires
to prescribe a new medical element for this patient. According to the policy we just
described, this request must be assigned grant access, therefore the system state
changes to state si+1 (last line of the table), containing the updated entry for the
medical record.
We make a few assumptions about the application: a representation of the
current state of the application under the form of a term is always available, as well
as the user requests. In practice, this will require to modify the program in order
to capture its state, and to intercept the control ﬂow for monitoring intervention,
every time a resource is to be accessed.
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4 The Policy Environment
Regarding access control, one is interested in stating which actions, principals (or
subjects) are allowed to execute in order to manipulate the objects (or resources) of a
given system. The most widespread representation schema to this end is the access
control matrix where lines list the subjects, columns contain the objects and cells
keep information about the privileges (read, right, execute) assigned to an active
entity over the passive ones.
This schema is enough to address most of the requirements for mandatory and
discretionary access control models, but it is not adequate to express highly abstract
policies, like the one from our running example, presented in Section 3. For declaring
this kind of policy, it is necessary to write sentences about the current values of
attributes of subjects and resources, and not only their identities. We call policy
environment the conﬁguration of all elements relevant to access control.
We call target system, denoted by T , any arbitrary application which must re-
spect a given security policy. A target is represented by a set of states and state
transitions, which are triggered by access requests. To each state si of T we asso-
ciate an algebraic term containing the facts that are true in si. Requests are also
represented as terms (see Figure 1).
The idea we defend here, which was also recently exposed in some papers [3,21],
is that access control is one aspect of the application, that can be speciﬁed, im-
plemented and maintained independently. Furthermore, the mechanism applying
a certain policy should be an external entity with respect to the application. An
overview picture of policy enforcement is presented in Figure 2. The application
context in state si together with the current request req(s, a, o) are delivered to a
reference monitor. The reference monitor evaluates every request according to the
current policy. In the case the policy grants access for the request, the application
proceeds. Otherwise, the execution of the application is aborted 4 .
We denote ΣT the signature of the target system T , which provides the proﬁles
of the constructors needed to build the representation of the system state. Con-
sequently, the database of facts at each stage of the execution of T is a the set
ground terms from T (ΣT ).
In out running example, we have used order-sorted speciﬁcations to formalize
the problem and the system using Maude [9].
Example 4.1 We use the signature below for the medical application described
in Section 3, where a patient is represented by a term containing name, number,
age, and a guardian, in this order. The keyword ctor indicates that the operator
it follows is a constructor.
fmod MEDICAL−SYSTEM−SIGNATURE i s
protecting STRING .
protecting NAT .
4 It would be possible to use exceptions to handle negative authorizations, but this issue is not explored in
this paper.
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permit(s, a, o)
Si
S i+1
Reference
Monitor
Context
Policy
Rules
req(s, a, o)
Figure 2. General representation schema
sort Patient Phys ic ian Record Administrator Guardian
MedicalElements OtherElements .
op pat i en t : S t r ing Nat Nat Guardian −> Pat ient [ ctor ] .
op admin i s t r a tor : Nat −> Administrator [ ctor ] .
op guardian : S t r ing −> Guardian [ ctor ] .
op phys i c i an : S t r ing Nat −> Phys ic ian [ ctor ] .
op record : Pat ient Phys ic ian MedicalElements
OtherElements −> Record [ ctor ] .
endfm
In order to better express policies, it is necessary to indicate which sorts from
ΣT are subsorts of subject, action and object, as well as to introduce the available
actions in T .
Example 4.2 The module below illustrates how we can determine subjects, objects
and actions in the medical system presented in Section 3, through the use of subsorts.
Actions are represented as constant symbols for simplicity.
fmod MEDICAL−SYSTEM−TERM−SIGNATURE i s
including MEDICAL−SYSTEM−SIGNATURE .
including POLICY−SIGNATURE .
subsort Phys ic ian < Subject .
subsort Pat ient < Subject .
subsort Guardian < Subject .
subsort Administrator < Subject .
subsort Record < Object .
subsort MedicalElements < Object .
subsort OtherElements < Object .
op readRecord : −> Action .
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op writeRecord : −> Action .
op readMedElements : −> Action .
op writeMedElements : −> Action .
op readOtherElements : −> Action .
op writeOtherElements : −> Action .
endfm
Sorts and subsorts allows us to distinguish subjects and objects among the sub-
terms appearing in the conjunction of ground terms (through the “+” operator) of
the target’s application current state. The order-sorted nature of the terms avoids
several common mistakes , because type-checking is performed on the speciﬁcations.
5 Rewriting-Based Policies
In this section, we address the problem of specifying access control policies through
term rewriting systems. We present an initial deﬁnition of security policy that
characterizes policies syntactically. This deﬁnition includes potentially “unsafe”
policies. After discussing the desired properties of an access control policies, we
present a reﬁned deﬁnition for “safe” policies.
A security policy is a statement of what is, and what is not, allowed [5]. When
dealing with access control, a (formal) policy speciﬁcation language will help to
unambiguously deﬁne the rules that will govern the actions principals are allowed
to execute over a set of resources. In order to deal with dynamic policies, a policy
speciﬁcation language has to provide means of encoding high level statements con-
cerning the policy environment, into a function from access requests to authorization
decisions.
In the following we present the signature for rewriting-based access control
policies. It clearly establishes the functions that need to be deﬁned by the rewrite
system in order to compute authorizations. Requests are represented as ground
terms containing the 3-tuple: subject, action and object, according to the con-
structor symbol below:
req : Subject ×Action×Object → Request
Positive and negative authorizations can be used in the same policy speciﬁcation
with the help of distinct constructors. The signatures for permit and deny contain
subject, action and object, which gives more control on the permissions (or denials)
generated from each request evaluation. The proﬁles for these constructors are
shown below:
{deny, permit} : Subject ×Action ×Object → Authorization
The goal of the policy designer is to provide a set of rules that will be used by
the reference monitor to evaluate every incoming request. The resulting decision
does not depend exclusively on the request, but also on the context of the target
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application at the time the request is made. In the formalism we introduce in this
paper, policies consist in a set of rewrite rules deﬁning the auth operator, whose
signature is
auth : Request× Term → Authorization
The auth function returns a decision term (permit or deny) derived from the nor-
malization process issued from a request term, and from the information contained
in the Term argument, which corresponds to a database of facts. The Term objects
can be aggregated in a conjunction of ground terms by the use of the associative
and commutative operator, “+”. This eases the expression of the conditions where
a certain access control rule must be applied. The full policy signature, ΣP , is
illustrated by the code that follows.
fmod POLICY−SIGNATURE i s
sort Object .
sort Subject .
sort Action .
sort Term .
sort Request .
sort Author izat ion .
subsort Subject < Term .
subsort Object < Term .
subsort Action < Term .
op req : Sub ject Action Object −> Request [ ctor ] .
op permit : Sub ject Action Object −> Author izat ion [ ctor ] .
op deny : Subject Action Object −> Author izat ion [ ctor ] .
op auth : Request Term −> Author izat ion .
op + : Term Term −> Term [ assoc comm ] .
endfm
Deﬁnition 5.1 [Rewriting-Based Access Control Policy] A rewriting-based access
control security policy, P, is a term rewriting system over T (Σ,X ), with Σ =
ΣT ∪ ΣP , where the top symbol of the left hand side of each rules is the auth
function.
This deﬁnition states that a given set of rewrite rules is an access control policy if
they transform terms rooted by auth symbol, which corresponds to the evaluation of
an access request in a given environment. The syntactical restriction helps focusing
on the actual problem of deﬁning the permissions that should be granted in a
given context. Although this deﬁnition seems restrictive, in practice rewriting-
based policies can work in conjunction with an auxiliary set of rewrite rules to help
deﬁning the auth function. The following example illustrates how a policy can be
declared.
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Example 5.2 The following set of rewrite rules translates the natural language
rules from Section 3 in our formalism. The rewrite rules appear in the same order
as the plain English statements.
mod POLICY1 i s
protecting MEDICAL−SYSTEM−TERM−SIGNATURE .
var p : Pat ient . var ph : Phys ic ian .
var g : Guardian . var adm : Administrator .
vars s1 s2 : S t r ing . var t : Term .
var n1 n2 : Nat . var me : MedicalElements .
var oe : OtherElements .
r l [ patReadRecord ] :
auth ( req(p, readRecord , record (p, ph, me, oe)) ,
p + record (p , ph , me , oe ) + t )
=> permit (p , readRecord , record (p , ph , me, oe ) ) .
r l [ guardReadRecord ] :
auth ( req( g , readRecord ,
record(patient (s1 , n1, n2, g) , ph, me, oe )) ,
p at i en t ( s1 , n1 , n2 , g ) +
record ( pat i en t ( s1 , n1 , n2 , g ) , ph , me, oe ) + t )
=> permit ( g , readRecord , record ( pa t i en t ( s1 , n1 , n2 , g ) ,
ph , me, oe ) ) .
r l [ physWriteMedElem ] :
auth ( req( ph, writeMedElements, record (p, ph, me, oe)) ,
r ecord (p , ph , me, oe ) + t )
=> permit ( ph , writeMedElements , record (p , ph , me, oe ) ) .
r l [ admReadMedElem] :
auth ( req( adm, readMedElements, record (p, ph, me, oe)) ,
adm + record (p , ph , me, oe ) + t )
=> deny (adm, readMedElements , record (p , ph , me, oe ) ) .
r l [ admWriteMedElem ] :
auth ( req( adm,writeMedElements, record (p, ph, me, oe)) ,
adm + record (p , ph , me, oe ) +t )
=> deny (adm, writeMedElements , record (p , ph , me, oe ) ) .
endm
There are several issues that can complicate policy enforcement. For example,
the term rewriting systems implementing a policy can be non-terminating. That
would block the target system when it makes certain access requests to the reference
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monitor, which would not be able to compute an authorization in ﬁnite time. We
suggest that a reﬁnement discipline for policy speciﬁcation should be followed, such
that veriﬁcation steps for checking a number of important properties are performed
before enforcing some policy. In the next section we discuss what are the desired
properties for rewriting-based policies.
5.1 Properties of security policies
Termination
The ﬁrst interesting property is termination. This ensures that every request
evaluation is ﬁnite, thus avoiding the target application execution to block indef-
initely. Termination of term rewriting systems has been widely studied and there
are many tools available that check termination of term rewriting systems such as
CiMe, Approve, Cariboo, to mention a few 5 .
Readers must be aware that policy combination may lead to problems, since
termination is not a modular property [24]. This means that the union of the sets
of rules of two terminating term rewriting systems may not produce a terminating
one. Most of the positive results on the union of term rewriting systems assume
the signature of the composed systems to be disjoint. A survey on modularity of
various properties of term rewriting systems is found on [15].
Consistency
The combined use of positive and negative authorizations brings two main prob-
lems: incompleteness, when no authorization is speciﬁed for a certain request, and
inconsistency, when for an access request there are both negative and positive au-
thorizations. Classical approaches for policy speciﬁcation adopt either the closed
policy or open policy assumption, meaning that only positive or negative authoriza-
tions need to be speciﬁed, respectively. This has shown to be restrictive in practice.
The current trend is to allow the user to discriminate between what is and what is
not allowed [10].
Another way to deal with that problem, is to adopt conﬂict resolution strategies,
that assign priorities to the conﬂicting cases. For example, one can say that deny
overrides any other authorization computed for a certain request. Correspondingly,
the permit overrides combinator always allow access in case of conﬂicting decisions.
This kind of disambiguation is available in a number of policy speciﬁcation lan-
guages, including XACML [20].
In the case of rewriting-based policies, conﬂicts are avoided if the corresponding
rewriting system has the conﬂuence property. This will ensure that a single response
is derived from a given request and from the application current state. In contrast
to termination, conﬂuence has a better behavior with respect to the union of two
conﬂuent term rewriting systems. It is known that conﬂuence is a modular property
of rewrite systems with disjoint signatures [25].
5 Check for references and results on the Termination Competition home page:
http://www.lri.fr/∼marche/termination-competition/
A.S. de Oliveira / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 59–7268
Completeness
Completeness means that for each request corresponds an authorization decision.
The usual way of assuring completeness is to assume that the open or closed policy
operates as default. In term rewriting, a system is said to be called suﬃciently
complete if all ground terms can be reduced to a normal form that only contains
constructors [6,13]. In the case of rewriting-based access control policies, this con-
sists in checking whether the auth function is completely deﬁned over the terms of
policy environment, and if its normal forms are permit or deny constructors.
Alternatively, the user can make use of “meta” rules to determine default de-
cisions in the case there are no redexes for a given request and environment. These
rules are either of the form
auth(req(s1, a1, o1), t) → deny(s1, a1, o1)
or
auth(req(s1, a1, o1), t) → permit(s1, a1, o1)
for closed or open policy respectively. These rules must be used at the meta level,
that is, the standard rewriting mechanism must take into account the fact that
these rules must be chosen when no other rule applies.
Given this discussion on the desired properties of an access control security
policies, we are ready to introduce the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5.3 [Trusted Security Policy] A trusted access control security policy is
a terminating and conﬂuent term rewriting system, P, on the signature Σ = ΣT∪ΣP ,
that completely deﬁnes the auth function.
The word trust was chosen to express that the system administrator can have
much more conﬁdence in a rewriting-based policy which has the properties of ter-
mination, conﬂuence and suﬃcient completeness. This ensures that the policy un-
ambiguously states authorizations.
6 Security Mechanisms
In this section we discuss how security mechanisms can implement rewriting-based
policies, and how systems can be considered secure with respect to this formaliza-
tion.
A Security mechanism ensures that a target system T does respect the policy
being enforced during its whole execution. A state transition of T , si → si+1,
corresponds to an access request from a subject to execute an action over a resource.
The security mechanism must apply the rewrite rules provided by a policy P, over
the terms of T and the current request, auth(req(s, a, o), t). In the case it evaluates
to permit(s, a, o), the computation of T can continue, if it evaluates to deny(s, a, o)
then the enforcement mechanism must abort the execution of T . This characterizes
an execution monitoring security mechanism [23].
A given state ti of a target’s execution is considered valid if the information
contained in that state is authentic, which means that the database of facts is not
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modiﬁed by an external malicious entity, and that this state was reached through
a sequence of positive authorizations.
Deﬁnition 6.1 [Secure System] A target system T is said secure w.r.t. a policy P,
if it starts from a valid state t0, and for every transition state ti → ti+1 a new valid
state is produced.
This deﬁnition is close to classical automata-based approaches of secure systems,
from Goguen and Meseguer [14], and more recently, Scheneider [23], where assertions
are stated about the possible execution paths of the target system.
Another advantage of this approach is that the security mechanism can be reused
to implement access control for diﬀerent policy sets, since the separation between
policy and mechanism is clear.
7 Related Work
The works more closely related with the one described in this paper are recent
initiatives that introduce term rewriting to the speciﬁcation of security policies.
In [12], term rewriting is used to control the conﬁdentiality level of data, by de-
scribing downgrading functions, in a concurrent programming setting, whose formal
model is based on a variant of process calculus.
In [2], authors model access control lists and role based access control (RBAC)
as term rewrite systems. They characterize consistency, totality, and completeness
of policies w.r.t the properties of the rewriting systems deﬁning them, thus sharing
some of the goals of this paper. However, we focus on the dynamic aspects of the
policy environment to specify authorizations, and how access control rules can be
integrated in program development. In general, the main advantage of the approach
we present here in comparison with access control lists and RBAC is that it is
possible to express more constraints over the policy environment in a ﬂexible way.
Most of the formal approaches based on rules to specify security policies rely on
some dialect of a “logic language”. We mention [16,11,18], to cite a few. Rewriting
has an associated logic [9] and calculus [8], which makes it an appropriate frame-
work for modeling various kinds of systems. The fact that rewriting used pattern
matching as its core mechanism makes available a number of important theoretical
results that are useful for analyzing security policies, as well.
For example, consider the consistency problem under policy composition. We
know that in the case of access control policies based in logics, this property can
be preserved by restricting the form of the rules, as discussed in [16]. In the other
hand, the rewriting-based approaches can proﬁt from existing results concerning the
modularity of the conﬂuence property. Under the same perspective, some necessary
conditions under which the termination of term rewriting systems is preserved, are
known [22,19]. This makes rewriting an interesting approach for deﬁning policies in
a declarative manner.
With respect to enforcement mechanisms, the work presented here follows the
line of program monitoring, and considers that the code implementing the applic-
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ation is untrusted. As an example, we mention the Polymer system [3], which
enforces access control on Java programs. Rewriting-based policies can be “inlined”
as a program monitor for any target application. This can be achieved by relating
the policy signature with the signature of the target program, in order to intercept
its sensitive function calls. One technique that allows such manipulation is program
transformation, that aims to generate new code, preserving the program semantics,
a ﬁeld where term rewriting is widely employed.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
We have discussed in this paper a formalization for access control policies using term
rewriting. The resulting language allows us to express access control rules which
capture dynamic conditions of the policy environment, providing a ﬂexible way to
encode authorizations. Rewrite speciﬁcations of access control written according
this proposal can be employed to rapidly prototype policies, since several eﬃcient
implementations of term rewriting systems are available. Reasoning about some
key properties of access control policies is also made possible, thanks to the corres-
pondence we have established between the properties of policies, like consistency,
and those of term rewriting systems.
As future work, we shall investigate how rewriting strategies can be useful
in policy composition and conﬂict resolution. An implementation for enforcing
rewriting-based policies will also be built, in order to validate this model, by using
the monitor inlining approach, as discussed in the previous section.
9 Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my advisors Claude and He´le`ne Kirchner for the fruitful
discussions on this subject, and also Judson Santiago and Horatiu Cirstea for reading
previous versions of this paper. I would like to thank the referees for their valuable
comments and suggestions.
References
[1] Baader, F. and T. Nipkow, “Term rewriting and all that,” Cambridge University Press, New York, NY,
USA, 1998.
[2] Barker, S. and M. Ferna´ndez, Term rewriting for access control., in: E. Damiani and P. Liu, editors,
DBSec, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4127 (2006), pp. 179–193.
[3] Bauer, L., J. Ligatti and D. Walker, Composing security policies with polymer., in: V. Sarkar and M. W.
Hall, editors, PLDI (2005), pp. 305–314.
[4] Bell, E. D. and L. J. LaPadula, Secure computer systems: Mathematical foundations, Technical Report
Mitre Report ESD-TR-73-278 (Vol. I-III), Mitre Corporation (1974).
[5] Bishop, M., “Introduction to Computer Security,” Addison-Wesley Professional, 2004.
[6] Bouhoula, A. and F. Jacquemard, Automatic veriﬁcation of suﬃcient completeness for conditional
constrained term rewriting systems, Technical Report RR-5863, INRIA (2006).
URL http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00070163/en/
A.S. de Oliveira / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 59–72 71
[7] Cirstea, H., Specifying authentication protocols using rewriting and strategies., in: I. V. Ramakrishnan,
editor, PADL, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1990 (2001), pp. 138–152.
[8] Cirstea, H. and C. Kirchner, The rewriting calculus — Part I and II, Logic Journal of the Interest
Group in Pure and Applied Logics 9 (2001), pp. 427–498.
[9] Clavel, M., F. Dura´n, S. Eker, P. Lincoln, N. Mart´ı-Oliet, J. Meseguer and J. F. Quesada, Maude:
speciﬁcation and programming in rewriting logic., Theor. Comput. Sci. 285 (2002), pp. 187–243.
[10] di Vimercati, S. D. C., P. Samarati and S. Jajodia, Policies, models, and languages for access control.,
in: S. Bhalla, editor, DNIS, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3433 (2005), pp. 225–237.
[11] Dougherty, D. J., K. Fisler and S. Krishnamurthi, Specifying and reasoning about dynamic access-
control policies., in: U. Furbach and N. Shankar, editors, IJCAR, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
4130 (2006), pp. 632–646.
[12] Echahed, R. and F. Prost, Security policy in a declarative style., in: P. Barahona and A. P. Felty,
editors, PPDP (2005), pp. 153–163.
URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1069774.1069789
[13] Gnaedig, I. and H. Kirchner, Computing constructor forms with non terminating rewrite programs.,
in: A. Bossi and M. J. Maher, editors, PPDP (2006), pp. 121–132.
[14] Goguen, J. A. and J. Meseguer, Security policies and security models., in: IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, 1982, pp. 11–20.
[15] Gramlich, B., On termination and conﬂuence properties of disjoint and constructor-sharing conditional
rewrite systems., Theor. Comput. Sci. 165 (1996), pp. 97–131.
[16] Halpern, J. Y. and V. Weissman, Using ﬁrst-order logic to reason about policies., in: CSFW (2003),
pp. 187–201.
[17] Jacquemard, F., M. Rusinowitch and L. Vigneron, Compiling and verifying security protocols., in:
M. Parigot and A. Voronkov, editors, LPAR, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1955 (2000), pp.
131–160.
[18] Jajodia, S., P. Samarati, M. L. Sapino and V. S. Subrahmanian, Flexible support for multiple access
control policies., ACM Trans. Database Syst. 26 (2001), pp. 214–260.
[19] Middeldorp, A., A suﬃcient condition for the termination of the direct sum of term rewriting systems,
in: LICS (1989), pp. 396–401.
[20] Moses, T., Extensible access control markup language (xacml) version 2.0, Technical report, OASIS
(2005).
[21] Pavlich-Mariscal, J. A., L. Michel and S. A. Demurjian, A formal enforcement framework for role-based
access control using aspect-oriented programming., in: L. C. Briand and C. Williams, editors, MoDELS,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3713 (2005), pp. 537–552.
[22] Rusinowitch, M., On termination of the direct sum of term-rewriting systems., Inf. Process. Lett. 26
(1987), pp. 65–70.
[23] Schneider, F. B., Enforceable security policies., ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 3 (2000), pp. 30–50.
[24] Toyama, Y., Counterexamples to termination for the direct sum of term rewriting systems., Inf. Process.
Lett. 25 (1987), pp. 141–143.
[25] Toyama, Y., On the church-rosser property for the direct sum of term rewriting systems., J. ACM 34
(1987), pp. 128–143.
A.S. de Oliveira / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 59–7272
